Анотація
The present research examines the main individual characteristics of independent directors in resolving conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers in public companies with dispersed ownership structure. In the modern corporate governance system, independent outside directors have become an integral part of boards of directors. The addition of independent directors to boards of directors aims to protect the interests of shareholders and is considered an effective mechanism to counterbalance the excessive influence and authority of top executives. However, the mere presence of these directors on the boards of directors of publicly traded companies should not be considered as providing full protection for the interests of shareholders. The quality of the performance of their basic monitoring and advising responsibilities are seriously affected by a number of personal characteristics of independent directors, such as incentives, a propensity to dis-tractions, and a low risk of personal responsibility.
Посилання
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